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The rebuilding process in the Gulf Coast is now in full swing,
bringing hope to many for a return to normalcy in the not-so-distant future.
The opportunities for abuse of the rank-and-file New Orleanian, however,
are ubiquitous. The enormous disaster that Hurricane Katrina provoked
occurred at a time when the gap between rich and poor in this country was at
its most pronounced in years. More specific to New Orleans, public and
private decisions over the past fifty years have resulted in a more segregated
city than ever in its history, pushing the poorer minorities to less desirable
(and formerly uninhabitable) flood-prone areas.
These citizens deserve a voice in their own futures, and they deserve
the protections that our laws can provide. By writing this article, I do not
presume to give them that voice. I only offer some legal arguments to
whoever takes on the burden of speaking.
L Introduction
Eminent domain in the United States has evolved from an
uncontroversial tool necessary for the country's economic development to a
broad, and arguably limitless, means of transferring property from one
private party to another, often as part of revitalization and gentrification
schemes. Given the current scope of allowable eminent domain takings, one
can imagine plausible situations where involuntary transfers in the name of
economic progress could be fundamentally unfair and offend the most basic
notions of property rights. Property rights are (at least textually) given equal
importance in the Fifth Amendment to the interests of life and liberty, which
are considered fundamental.1 Thus, one can argue that current Takings
Clause case law has overstepped its bounds, giving rise to situations where
government action that is nominally constitutional under the Takings Clause
could be viewed as unconstitutional under substantive due process standards.
I U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of the law ...."). See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327-30 (1921) (recognizing certain
"fundamental" property rights); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L. J. 127, 133-
42 (1990) (noting that American Founders had a broader and more comprehensive understanding of
property than the modem approach).
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In this essay, I hope to touch on some of the problems with Takings
Clause jurisprudence as it currently stands. My note will focus
predominantly on the "public use" limitation of the Takings Clause, as well
as on the use of the Takings Clause in the context of urban renewal
schemes.2 In hopes of better describing some of the troubling implications of
the law today, I plan to apply it to a plausible real world, though
hypothetical, situation with which most people are somewhat familiar. An
examination of the recovery in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina
reveals both the flaws of current Takings Clause analysis and the many due
process, and even equal protection, violations that can go unchecked.
The task of returning property rights to protected status will prove
not to be an easy one. For example, urging the Court to adopt an
incorporated approach to eminent domain challenges (wherein judicial
scrutiny of a Takings Clause challenge would incorporate elements of due
process and/or equal protection analysis) would appear to be in vain. The
Court has rejected appeals to read equal protection analysis into a challenge
on other constitutional grounds.3 Additionally, current judicial doctrine
would seemingly offer little protection for individuals bringing either due
process or equal protection challenges to an eminent domain action.4 It has
become exceedingly difficult to show the requisite discriminatory intent to
succeed in equal protection challenges.5 The Court has also effectively
relegated property rights to a rung lower than those "fundamental" rights that
are deserving of substantive due process protection.6
Indeed, although individuals' property rights could conceptually fall
under the umbrella of the Takings, Due Process and Equal Protection
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996) (finding that an examination of
subjective intention is proper in equal protection analysis but not in Fourth Amendment, and that
incorporating this equal protection factor into a Fourth Amendment analysis is improper).
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-33 (1954) (rejecting petitioner's claim that the eminent
domain action at issue was a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights). See also Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (refusing to analyze a claim of use of excessive force by police officers
under the generalized substantive due process approach and instead using the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" standard).
5 See Arlington Heights v. Metro. House. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (describing several
factors used in judicial analysis of equal protection claims, and establishing a high burden of proof to
show discriminatory intent). Part 11 of this article covers equal protection implications in more detail
and, though New Orleans minorities could make a strong argument for equal protection violations, the
Court requires substantial proof to infer a finding of discriminatory intent. Only in very rare cases do
victims proffer sufficient proof to convince the Court to make this finding.
6 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L. J. 555, 555-59
(1997) [hereinafter Krotoszynski] (describing the Supreme Court's disinclination towards extending
"fundamental" status to property rights under modern day substantive due process jurisprudence).
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Clauses, individuals can in practice be left with no protection. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has moved towards providing less protection for
property rights under the Takings Clause, while simultaneously refusing to
expand the protection of other constitutional clauses to maintain the balance.7
Certain property rights essentially have been left unprotected. In the
following pages, I highlight the inadequacies of the law is it now stands and I
argue that currently unprotected, yet fundamental, property rights be
relocated under the protection of substantive due process.
Part I of this article provides a brief history of the concept and
development of eminent domain law in the United States. It also describes
and critiques the most important recent U.S. Supreme Court cases that have
shaped eminent domain jurisprudence as it stands today. Part II offers a brief
recapitulation of the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina and the resulting
flood in New Orleans. Also in Part 1I, I offer a hypothetical eminent domain
action in New Orleans, and demonstrate the inadequacy of current Takings
Clause interpretation by running through a plausible judicial analysis
concerning the validity of the use of eminent domain. Part III discusses the
Equal Protection Clause, and its implications for the issues that the modem
Takings Clause interpretation poses. By looking to a history of racially
discriminatory practices in New Orleans, one can make a plausible argument
that an eminent domain action under certain circumstances would result in
equal protection violations. To support this contention, I will apply the
accepted test of disproportionate impact and discriminatory intent as set forth
in recent case law.8 Part IV follows with Substantive Due Process violations
implicated by the hypothetical situation first sketched in Part II. In Part IV, I
will also discuss the Court's current confusion in locating certain
constitutional rights and offer some proposals for reconciling the
constitutional themes discussed in order to ensure at least a modicum of
protection for important property interests, such as homesteads. Part V
concludes.
7 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (holding that the City's
proposed condemnations were for a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution); Tahoe-Sieffa Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002) (holding that he moratoria ordered by the agency were not per se takings of property requiring
compensation under the Takings Clause).
8 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a successful equal protection
challenge must demonstrate that a law has had a disproportionate impact on a protected group, and that
legislators had discriminatory intent when passing that law); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252
(describing several factors used in judicial analysis of equal protection claims to determine if evidentiary
sources are powerful enough to make an inference of discriminatory intent absent explicit proof thereof).
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II. Eminent Domain Jurisprudence
The concept of eminent domain, and more specifically the Takings
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, has undergone significant evolution in recent
history. This section briefly documents the foundations of eminent domain,
including the original understanding of the Takings Clause at the time of its
inclusion in the U.S. Constitution. Historically, eminent domain was left to
state action and state court review, but the modem trend is for the U.S.
Supreme Court to take a more active role in this area of the law. Following
the description of eminent domain's early history, this section will analyze
the U.S. Supreme Court's most important recent cases with a focus on urban
renewal and the Court's treatment of "public use." The section concludes
with discussion of the most recent in this line of cases, Kelo v. City of New
London,9 and where that holding leaves the judicial understanding of eminent
domain in the United States today.
III. Early History of Eminent Domain
The exact origins of the power of eminent domain are unclear.
However, scholars claim its use can be traced back at least as far as the
Romans.' ° After the decline of the Roman Empire, the practice of eminent
domain disappeared largely due to the fact that, under existing feudal
systems, ultimate ownership of all property fell to the sovereign and, hence,
no private property could be taken." Eminent domain took definite shape as
Europe emerged from feudal society and began to recognize individual
ownership, with political philosophers in Holland taking the lead.'
2
Of more relevance to the U.S. context, English precedents point to
two distinct powers. First, the Crown had the power to make use
9 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469. The plaintiffs, owners of condemned property, filed suit alleging that
the city's exercise of eminent domain power on ground takings were not for public use. Id. at 475. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that all of the City's proposed takings were valid. Id. at 476. The
court determined that the takings were authorized by chapter 132, the State's municipal development
statute, and that the intended use of the land was sufficiently definite and had been given "reasonable
attention" during the planning process. Id. at 476-77. The Supreme Court affirmed, declining to "second-
guess the City's determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the [urban
planning and development] project." Id. at 488-89.
0 1 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 4 (2d ed. 1917). See also Lawrence
Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 204 (1978) (discussing the
origins of the power of eminent domain).
I NICHOLS, supra note 10, at 5.
12 Id. at 5, 31 (noting analytical contributions concerning eminent domain by Dutch political
philosophers Hugo Grotius and Cornelius van Bynkershoek).
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2007)
temporarily, but not take ownership, of land to advance certain interests such
as navigation, foreign affairs and national defense. 13 The justification for the
Crown's power rested partially in the doctrine of necessity (the act was
necessary for the preservation of the kingdom), and partially in the idea that
the Crown was thought to have superior title. 14 Second, Parliament had the
right to expropriate private property completely provided that it paid just
compensation to the injured party. 15 This second power is closer to our own
concept of eminent domain, and the English justified its use as a part of the
consent that all people give to lawmakers when they live in a system of
representative government. 1
6
Early American colonists embraced eminent domain as a power akin
to the English Parliament's right to expropriate property. To justify the
power, colonists generally made two requirements: that the expropriation be
an act of a legislature (not on behalf of the Crown), and that compensation be
paid. 17 The reliance on English foundations continued during the struggle for
independence, as the drafters of early state constitutions often used language
reflecting the consent theory of representative government and the
compensation requirement, which stems from Lockean concepts of property
rights.'8
Virginia and Pennsylvania were the first states to include the term
"public use" in their state constitutions, both in 1776.19 The eminent domain
provisions in these documents were followed by other states, often verbatim,
as they drew up constitutions as well.20  The Takings Clause of the U.S
Constitution finds its place in the Fifth Amendment, authored by James
Madison.2' Interestingly, there is little record of debate on the passage of the
13 Berger, supra note 10, at 204.
14 Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-called
"Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 1245, 1259 (2002).
15 Berger, supra note 10, at 204.
16 Harrington, supra note 14, at 1264.
17 Id. at 1270.
18 Id. at 1275. John Locke wrote extensively on the sanctity of property and the government's
role in protecting its citizens' right to property. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, in
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 378 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1960) (1689). See
also Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 237, 253 (2006) (describing the influence Locke's writings had on drafters of the
Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution). Although a government could simply "take" money through
taxation, the taking of land through eminent domain required some form of compensation due to the
importance of property rights. Harrington, supra note 14, at 1268.
19 Berger, supra note 10, at 204.
20 Harrington, supra note 14, at 1275-76. Other states adopting eminent domain provisions
similar to Virginia and Pennsylvania were Delaware (1776), Vermont (1776 & 1786), Massachusetts
(1780) and New Hampshire (1784). Id.
21 William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. Gov 553, 595
(1972).
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Fifth Amendment. Determining the framers' true intent concerning the
22Takings Clause is therefore an exercise in conjecture. 2 Case law and
scholarly work, however, give us a rich history of the development of
eminent domain jurisprudence after the Takings Clause was enacted.
There have historically been two alternative definitions of "public
use": (1) general advantage or benefit to the public, known as the broad
view; and (2) actual use by the public, known as the narrow view.23 In the
early years of the United States, few situations consistently gave rise to the
use of eminent domain z4 In a vast and sparsely populated land, rights of
way for roads and flowage easements for mills were seen as much more
important to the overall development of the country than the protection of
individual property rights in these instances. Thus, even if the sole benefit of
a road across a private individual's land was to provide another private
individual with access to a public road, the validity of using eminent domain
to obtain the land for that road was rarely questioned. 5 Given the necessity
of eminent domain in developing a new country and the founders' lack of
fear of abuse,26 the early trend favored a broad view of public use in eminent
domain usage.
The mid-nineteenth century brought increased industrialization and a
proliferation of the use of eminent domain, often to the benefit of privately-
owned railroad companies. Fearing legislative overreaching and abuse of the
expropriation power, many state courts adopted the narrow view of public
use, requiring actual use by the public of land condemned through eminent
22 Both houses of Congress adopted the amendment without debating the expropriation clause.
CONG. REC. (Aug. 21, 1789), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS:
DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES 1309-10 (Kenneth R. Bowling and
Helen E. Veit eds., 1998); 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, MAR. 4, 1789-MAR. 3, 1791: SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 154 (Linda Grant De
Pauw ed., 1972). See also Harrington, supra note 14, at 1284-86 (noting that the House did not alter in
the least the portion of the amendment dealing with expropriation and that neither the House nor the
Senate made any substantial change in substance to the amendment). Harrington also argues that most
members of Congress, in record of debate that does exist, were more concerned with due process concerns
and generally found the Takings Clause as written was sufficient to protect against eminent domain
abuses. Id. at 1299.
23 Berger, supra note 10, at 205 (citing 2A C. Nichols, Eminent Domain § 7.1, 2 (rev. 3d ed. J.
Sackman & P. Rohan, 1976)).
24 See Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B. U. L.
REV. 615, 617 (1940) (noting that in the early years of this country, there were only a few situations were
eminent domain was used).
25 Id.
26 See id. at 616 (stating that the framers likely did not intend the Constitution to protect against
the government's use of eminent domain).
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domain.27 One of the most notable opinions promoting the narrow view of
public use was Senator Tracy's concurrence in Bloodgood v. Mohawk &
Hudson Railroad Co. 28 In his opinion, Tracy questioned whether a broad
view of "public use" put any meaningful limit whatsoever on the
government's power to expropriate.29 Proponents of the narrow view argued
that "an incidental, amorphous benefit accruing to the public after taking land
and transferring it to a private party was insufficient to satisfy the 'public
use' limitation on eminent domain. 30  Indeed, Tracy's narrow view of the
public use requirement was not fully embraced by courts nationwide, yet it
persisted as a worthy counter to the broad view and held considerable sway
in state courts into the early twentieth century.3'
The presence of two competing understandings of "public use" in
state courts meant that no coherent, established judicial analysis asserted
itself.32 Instead, the outcome of any given eminent domain challenge was
unpredictable, and judicial doctrine was in disarray.33 The United States
Supreme Court provided little guidance to state courts and did not offer
meaningful review of any state cases until 1896. In Missouri Pacific
Railway v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held for the first time that a state
exercise of eminent domain was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.34 The Court, however, has rarely reversed a state
supreme court's finding of a "public use" and has taken an increasingly
deferential stance towards state courts and legislatures in determining the
validity of an eminent domain taking.35
Although the narrow view of public use had significant influence in
the early twentieth century, a gradual shift began that once again favored the
broader, "public advantage" view of the public use limit on eminent domain.
In the pre-industrialized period, eminent domain actions generally focused
on condemning lands for the purpose of building dams and mills, 36 rights of
27 See Berger, supra note 10, at 208 (describing state court case law concerning the public use
limitation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
28 18 Wend. 9, 56-62 (N.Y. 1837) (Tracy, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 60.
30 Lopez, supra note 18, at 261 (2006) (describing the understanding of "public use" held by
theorists such as Senator Tracy and Thomas M. Cooley).
31 Berger, supra note 10, at 209.
32 See id. (noting that the two views of "public use" resulted in a lack of predictability).
33 Legal scholar Lawrence Berger goes so far as to argue that "by the beginning of the twentieth
century, doctrine was in a shambles and predictability of result at a minimum." Id.
34 Id. at 213 (citing Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896)).
35 In fact, Lawrence Berger states in his 1976 article: "As far as can be found, this is the only
time that the Court ever reversed a state supreme court's decision that a taking was for a public use."
Berger, supra note 10, at 213.
36 See id. at 206-07 (discussing the Mill Acts; citing, inter alia, Hazen v. Essex Co., 66 Mass. (12
Cush.) 475, 478 (1853)).
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way across private land for the construction of roads,37 and later for
development of the railroad network38 and irrigation systems in the arid
West.39 As once-new cities decayed and languishing urban ghettoes became
a concern, local governments began to use the eminent domain power to
"revitalize" urban centers. 40 These actions were accompanied by a revival of
the broad view of "public use," but with a twist.
In N.Y. City Housing Auth. v. Muller, the New York state courts
initiated a crucial "public use" shift by looking to the condition of property at
issue and the public safety benefit achieved simply by the taking itself.4' In
this way, as noted in later cases, the exercise of eminent domain alone was
sufficient to satisfy the "public use" limitation. In other words, the simple
fact that the government was putting an end to a detrimental or dangerous
use of the private property was enough of a benefit to the general public that
the taking could be found to satisfy the "public use" limitation of the Takings
Clause.43
The U.S. Supreme Court has also ruled on several important urban
redevelopment and land use cases in recent years.44 A discussion of three of
the most important cases follows, with particular focus on the Court's legal
reasoning and treatment of the public use limitation contained in the Takings
Clause.
37 See id. at 207-08 (discussing the "Landlocked Owner" cases).
38 See id. at 208 (noting the proliferation of the use of eminent domain to benefit privately-owned
railroad companies).
39 See id. at 210-11 (citing Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371 (1904).
40 See id. at 214-17 (discussing the use of eminent domain to clear blighted property).
41 N.Y. Housing Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. 1936). See also Wendell Pritchett,
The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 1, 24-27 (2003) (discussing the use of eminent domain in early cases of urban planning),
William E. Nelson, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, PoLITIcs AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-
1980, at 28 (2001) (detailing New York's central role in reshaping interpretation of the 'public use'
clause).
42 See, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (finding that Congress' determination that the use of eminent
domain to eliminate substandard housing standards is a valid public use).
43 See id. at 103-04 (finding that Congress had authority to prevent future slums from being born,
and removing dangerous breeding grounds was the way to accomplish that goal).
4 See generally Berman, 348 U.S. at 26-33, Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469 (2005).
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IV. Berman v. Parker
The U.S. Supreme Court took its greatest step in broadening the
understanding of "public use" in 1954. 45 Berman v. Parker concerned a
challenge to a District of Columbia redevelopment plan by a business owner
in a neighborhood in Southwest Washington, D.C.4 6 The redevelopment
plan came about with Congress' passage of the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act in 1945. 47 In an attempt to improve upon substandard
housing conditions in the District that it considered "injurious to the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare," Congress directed the National Capital
Planning Commission to develop a land use plan to revive certain blighted
areas. 48 The Planning Commission's first venture involved Project Area B in
Southwest Washington, where it was reported that 64.3% of dwellings were
beyond repair and 18.4% needed major repairs. 49 Projected Area B
contained 5,012 people, 97.5% of whom were black.5°
After the Planning Commission adopted the plan, the District of
Columbia Land Redevelopment Agency was then charged with assembling
the real property in the area and pursuing a course of redevelopment. 1
Although the Agency was authorized to transfer the land to public agencies,
the Act stated that preference should be given to private development
corporations in land transfers. 2 In bringing suit, the petitioner claimed that
his department store was not slum housing and could not be considered
injurious to the public health. Hence, taking his private property would
amount to violations of both the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the 5th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.53
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas delivered a brief and
deferential opinion.54 The Court rooted Congress' legislative powers over
D.C. in the police power; the limits of which it found would be fruitless to
define. It follows that determinations concerning the public interest are
45 See generally Berman, 348 U.S. at 26.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 28.
4S Id. at 28-29.
49 Id. at 30.
50 Id. Although thousands of blacks were uprooted during this urban development project,
neither side made mention of race in any of the briefs submitted. Pritchett, supra note 41, at 44. This fact
is particularly remarkable given that the foundational case Brown v. Bd. of Education was decided just
four months before Berman was argued. Id.
51 Berman, 348 U.S. at 31 (finding that the Agency had begun to redevelop at time of suit).
52 Id. at 30 (citing DC Redevelopment Act, § 7(g)).
53 Id. at 31.
5 Id. at 28.
55 Id. at 31-32.
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completely within this police power, and the judiciary has a very limited role
in reviewing whether or not the power is being exercised for a public
56purpose. The Court's narrow review found Congress' public purpose of
promoting public health and safety, and the standards contained in the
Redevelopment Act, to be adequate and reasonable.57 It therefore found that,
once the public purpose was determined to be valid, the method and means
of achieving Congress' goal were left to its own discretion.58 In fully
asserting its position of abject deference, the Supreme Court went beyond the
lower court's ruling by clearly stating that not only the dilapidated buildings,
but also the land on which they stood, could be taken in full title.59 The
Berman Court also upheld the practice of turning land over to private
enterprise after exercising eminent domain, once again deferring to the
legislative branch on the validity of such decisions.6 °
The Berman decision served as the Court's unambiguous approval of
a broad understanding of "public use" on the Federal level. 6' Deference to
the legislative branch on determining a public purpose now allowed
redevelopment agencies across the country unchecked freedom in areas
designated for revitalization. The Court sweepingly and unceremoniously
interpreted the "public use" clause, explicit in the Fifth Amendment, to allow
the taking of property that was immediately put back into the private sector
for redevelopment. Although lower and state courts had been pushing
towards a broader "public use" standard during the urban revitalization
period in the 1940's, the Supreme Court decisively ushered in a new era.62
V. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
The Supreme Court waited nearly thirty years to revisit the issue of
eminent domain and the bounds of the "public use" clause. The result in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff was a strong reinforcement of the
Berman ruling. 63  In Midkiff, landowners brought suit to challenge the
Hawaii legislature's attempt to undo a long-standing land oligopoly, a
56 Id. at 32.
57 Id. at 35.
58 Id. at 33.
59 Id. at 36.
60 Id. at 33-34.
61 See generally Berman, 348 U.S. at 26.
62 See Pritchett, supra note 41, at 25-26 (detailing state court activity that indicated a shift
towards a broader view of public use).
63 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229, 240-42 (1984) (finding that the Hawaii Act was constitutional
based upon the Berman findings).
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remnant of the Polynesian settlers' feudal land tenure system.64 While 49%
of Hawaii's land was owned by the State and Federal governments, a mere
72 private individuals held title to another 47% of the usable land in
Hawaii.65 The Land Reform Act of 1967 created a condemnation scheme
under the Hawaii Housing Authority whereby houses owned by tenants on
lots rented from the landowners were condemned. The lots were then
acquired by the State and subsequently transferred to the tenants. 66 The Act
set forth various requirements, including a tenant's showing his ability to pay
for the lot, a process to determine just compensation, and public hearings to
assure the property transfer would "effectuate the public purposes" of the
Act.
67
The Midkiff Court rested its analysis firmly on the foundations of
Berman.68  Citing often to Berman, the Court held that the "public use"
requirement was coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers. 69  Giving broad deference to the legislature's determinations, the
Court conceded its reviewing role was "extremely narrow" and framed its
analysis on whether the exercise of eminent domain was rationally related to
a conceivable public purpose. 70 The Act's stated purpose was to regulate an
oligopoly and its associated evils, which included artificial deterrents that led
to a malfunctioning land market, inflated land prices, and injury to public
tranquility and welfare.7 ' With little discussion, the Court found this
exercise of Hawaii's police powers to be a proper public purpose.72
The Court moved on to consider whether the means of achieving that
public purpose were rationally related to its stated purpose. It found that
redistribution of land title to correct deficiencies in the market due to an
oligopoly was a rational exercise of eminent domain.73 This brief discussion
Id. at 232.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 233-34.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 240-42.
69 Id. at 240.
70 Id. at 240-41 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 26). The Court states here that the determination
of whether a taking meets the "public use" limitation of the Takings Clause should involve minimal
judicial scrutiny, or rationality review. Rationality review is also used in challenges to economic
regulations under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma statute regulating opticians' professional activities after
requiring only that the legislature demonstrate a conceivable basis on which the legislation is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest).
71 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232, 242.
72 Id. at 242.
73 Id. at 242-43.
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concluded the Court's deferential analysis, and the remainder of the opinion
focused on deficiencies in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
74
Midkiff therefore signaled a powerful reinforcement of Berman,
while plunging judicial scrutiny of the exercise of eminent domain to a new
low. While Midkiff explicitly stated that the practice of taking private
property from A and transferring it to B for B's sole use and benefit would
be forbidden by the Constitution, the Court nevertheless held in that case that
a State may transfer property from A to B when B is not a "particular class of
identifiable individuals.75 The Court found that this taking, essentially a
transfer from private individual to private individual, was in and of itself a
public benefit.76 The benefit of redistribution in this case, though there was
no actual public use, was sufficient to meet the Court's definition of public
purpose.77  If Midkiff is read broadly, we see the "public use" clause lose
meaning almost to the point of eliminating it as a limitation on the exercise
of eminent domain.78
On the other hand, a narrower reading of Midkiff might suggest that
the case should be limited to its facts. Under this understanding, that
eminent domain effectively transferred property from one private entity to
another should be of little importance in the analysis. Of greater importance,
and the point on which the Court seized, was the public benefit of correcting
an ineffective market based on inflated land prices.79 The benefit of land
redistribution in this case, though there was no actual use by the public, was
sufficient to meet the Court's definition of public purpose.
80
If one accepts the narrow reading of Midkiff as a unique situation not
found in other parts of the United States, the result is nonetheless
74 The Court found that the Court of Appeals read the "public use" jurisprudence too narrowly in
requiring that the government possess and use the property at some point prior to transferring it to another
private individual. Id. at 243. The Court held that the taking and the transfer themselves were a valid
public purpose and, therefore, the absence of government possession did not hinder a finding of valid
public use: "[G]ovemment does not itself have to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the
taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause." Id. at 244.
In addition, the Court found that the Court of Appeals had erred in applying more rigorous judicial
scrutiny to determinations of a state legislature than it would have applied to determinations of the U.S.
Congress. Id.
75 Id. at 245. But see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) ("[A] law that takes property from
A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such
powers .... ") (emphasis deleted).
76 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
77 Id.
78 See Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207,
209 (2004) (arguing that the MidkiffCourt eviscerated the public use requirement).
79 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243.
80 Id. at 245.
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problematic in certain ways. The Court noted the market correction
reasoning of the Hawaii legislature as a legitimate public purpose, yet it
failed to limit its holding in the case.8' Instead, Midkiff set a dangerous
precedent that approved the transfer of property from one private entity to
another by way of the Takings Clause.82 While neglecting to tackle its future
implications, the Midkiff ruling further lowered the limitations placed on the
exercise of eminent domain by relaxing the public use standard enunciated in
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
VI. Kelo v. City of New London
While state courts continued to struggle with finding a cohesive and
predictable "public use" analysis,83 the Supreme Court finally breached its
silence on the subject in 2005 with Kelo v. City of New London.84 The city of
New London, Connecticut had seen better days in the past as a whaling
community and manufacturing center, but it fell on hard times as those
industries faltered. Steady economic decline in the city finally led a state
agency in 1990 to declare New London a "distressed municipality., 85 To
address the problem, New London revived the New London Development
Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity earlier created to facilitate
economic development.86  The Fort Trumbull area of the city was
particularly affected by the hard times, but it received a windfall in 1998
when pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, Inc. announced plans to build a new
research facility adjacent to the neighborhood. 87 Seizing the opportunity, the
NLDC worked quickly to design a development plan for Fort Trumbull that
would create an attractive mixed use waterfront area, including office space,
81 Id.
82 Id. at 243-44.
83 Of particular note is the Poletown/Hathcock saga, played out in the Michigan Supreme Court.
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), the Michigan court
adopted a broad view of the "public use" requirement and upheld an eminent domain action acquiring a
large swath of an historic Polish neighborhood for an immediate transfer to General Motors Corp. There,
the court held that the new GM plant would provide jobs and an overall economic boost to the city, a
"clear and significant" public benefit. Id. at 459. After twenty years of controversy, the Michigan
Supreme Court overruled Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
Hathcock presented very similar facts to those in Poletown: an eminent domain action was used to acquire
land for the construction of a business and technology park. Id. at 769. The Michigan court, however,
drastically changed course from its Poletown precedent and found that the park would serve a primary
benefit to a private entity. Id. at 786. The action, therefore, did not satisfy the "public use" requirement
of Michigan's constitution. Id. at 786-87.
84 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.
85 Id. at 473.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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restaurants, shopping, a renovated marina and pedestrian riverwalk as well as
88other recreational opportunities. The properties at issue in this case,
though not blighted or otherwise in poor condition, were condemned by the
city to allow the revitalization to go according to plan.89  Among the
petitioners faced with losing their homes was Wilhelmina Dery, who had
been born in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and had lived there her entire
life.90 Mrs. Dery's husband moved into the house when they married in
1946, and their son lived next door in a house that was given to him as a
wedding present.91 In all, nine petitioners commenced the action, alleging
that the taking would violate the "public use" restriction of the Fifth
Amendment.
92
In a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court majority found in
favor of the City of New London.93 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
began the opinion by discussing two hypothetical situations, which represent
the bounds of takings clause jurisprudence.94 First, he noted a government
clearly may not, "take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it
to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.
'" 95
However, a government is completely justified in transferring property from
one private party to another as long as "use by the public" (such as a railroad)
is the purpose of the taking.96 Although these two propositions are clear,
Stevens found that the situation at issue fell somewhere in the muddy, more
difficult middle.97
Justice Stevens continued the opinion by noting historical handling
of Takings Clause challenges, particularly that courts in the mid-19th century
interpreted the "public use" clause narrowly to mean "use by the public.
98
He quickly disposed of this test though, claiming that it was difficult to
88 Id. at 474.
89 Id. at 475.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). To add insult to injury, eleven of the fifteen
condemned properties were within "Parcel 4-A," which had been designated as parking and support for
the nearby marina. Id. at 474. Essentially, the homes at issue would be tom down and replaced not by a
sleek, modem marina facility or high traffic shopping mall, but by a parking lot. The New London
Superior Court originally granted a permanent restraining order disallowing the taking of these properties,
but the U.S. Supreme Court eventually overturned the order. Id. at 475-76.
92 Id. at 475.
93 Id. at 490.
94 Id. at 477.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 478-79.
98 Id. at 479 n.7 (citing Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 410 (1876)).
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administer and, "impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of
society." 99 Instead, Stevens found that the central question was whether the
taking by New London achieved a "public purpose.''1°  In his analysis,
Stevens noted the broad deference given to the legislative branch in both
Berman and Midkiff, and found that, "[f]or more than a century, our public
use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny
in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public
needs justify the use of the takings power."'' 1 Finding that the city used a
carefully formulated and comprehensive plan, thorough deliberation in its
proceedings, and was striving to provide appreciable economic benefits to
the community, Stevens indicated that deferential review of the legislature's
actions was proper.102 Under this approach, the Court held that the plan
unquestionably served a public purpose and therefore met the "public use"
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 
10 3
The Court, in making its finding, addressed arguments made by the
petitioners. First, petitioners argued that economic development by itself did
not constitute a public purpose. 14 The Court noted that promoting economic
development has traditionally been an accepted function of government.
0 5
Again citing to Berman and Midkiff, Stevens held that "there is no basis for
exempting economic development from our traditionally broad
understanding of public purpose.'' 6 Second, petitioners argued that using
eminent domain for economic development would destroy any distinction
between public and private takings. 107 In response, the Court cited Berman,
noting that property transfer from private parties to private developers could
indeed serve a public purpose and, in fact, that public purpose may be better
accomplished by private parties rather than by the government itself.0 8 The
development plan in this case was not adopted "to benefit a particular class
of identifiable individuals."10 9 Therefore, deference to the legislature again
led the court to find that the taking had a public purpose. By relying on over
a century of case law, the Kelo Court expanded the definition of public use to
99 Id. at 479.
100 Id. at 480.11 Id. at 483.
102 Id. at 489.
103 Id. at 490.
104 Id. at 484.
1o5 Id.
106 Id. at 485.
107 Id.
106 Id. at 485-86 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33).
109 Id. at 478 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245).
WAKE OF THE FLOOD: PROPERTY RIGHTS POST-KATRINA
include takings that provide any sort of indirect economic benefit to the
public.
To reach the necessary five votes, the majority relied on the cautious
support of Justice Kennedy, who also wrote a concurring opinion. 10 As the
important fifth vote, his caveats arguably hold significance in the overall
determination of the case. In his concurrence, Kennedy focused on the issue
of clear benefit to particular private parties.1 ' He argued for a stronger
standard of review than that announced in Berman and Midkiff in cases
where there was a risk of "undetected, impermissible favoritism."' 1 2 In his
view, the present case offered no signs of impermissible favoritism." 3 In
coming to this conclusion, he found it particularly noteworthy that the
identities of most of the private beneficiaries of the City's plan were
unknown at the time that it was formulated. 1 4  Thus, while ultimately
agreeing with the majority, Kennedy warned of the possibility of abuses by
private interests of eminent domain powers that could be accomplished under
the current interpretation of public use.'15
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, vigorously dissented, arguing that the majority opinion
effectively reduced the public use requirement included in the Fifth
Amendment to a phrase devoid of meaning.' 6 O'Connor argued that the
majority's analysis "wash[ed] out the distinction between private and public
use of property - and thereby effectively delete[d] the words 'or public use'
from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."' 17 O'Connor argued
instead that the "public use" clause imposes a limitation on the Takings
Clause, which necessarily embodies the concepts of fairness and justice.'18
While agreeing with the majority that the public purpose standard was
acceptable as laid out in Berman and Midkiff, O'Connor found the situation
in Kelo to be distinguishable."19 In those cases, the taking itself served a
public purpose in that it eliminated the previous harmful use of the property:
"Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that
11o Id. at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
II Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).




116 Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117 Id.
118 Id., at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336 (2002)).
119 Id. at 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the property was turned over to private use.' ' 120 In Kelo, however, the
condemned property was well-maintained and did not pose any sort of social
harm.1
21
O'Connor also argued that the police power and public use are not
necessarily one and the same; a public use must be found independently.
122
In Berman and Midkiff, use of the police power was legitimate because the
takings themselves were for a public purpose, as discussed above. 123  But
according to Justice O'Connor, in Kelo, while the government's actions may
have fallen within its police power, that alone did not mean that the actions
were for a public purpose. 124 Because the taking provided private benefit to
the transferee and only incidental, or "indirect," public benefit, it can not be
held that the public use requirement was met. 125
The Kelo verdict was understandably met with vast criticism and
public outcry.' 26 The Kelo opinion was carefully crafted to read as though it
was a logical outcome that followed easily from a long line of recent case
law, not as the culmination of a snowballing course of misinterpretation.
The broad legislative deference granted in Kelo was just as apparent in
Berman and Midkiff.127 The Court found in those cases that a transfer from
one private party to another in eminent domain takings fell within the scope
of a state's 2police power and the "public use" clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 12 Thus, in allowing broad deference to a legislature to
determine that a public purpose is met and to effect transfer to a private
120 Id. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 501-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 501-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent that focused on the
original intent behind the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 505-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Referring to numerous sources from the 18th and 19th centuries, he argued that the "public use" clause
was intended to serve as a limitation on the practice of eminent domain and current interpretation ignores
this limit. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Going further, Justice Thomas argued that recent case law,
including Berman and Midkiff, erred by equating eminent domain with the police power and by giving
such broad deference to legislative determinations. Id. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126 See Kenneth R. Harney, Court Ruling Leaves Poor at Greatest Risk, WASH. POST, July 2,
2005, at Fl, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwpdyn/content/article/2005/07/01/
AR2005070100990.html (asserting that property rights are now at greater risk and encouraging citizens to
fight the ruling at the local and state levels); see also Hands Off Our Homes, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 18,
2005 (discussing possible far-reaching implications of Kelo).
127 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 236 (deciding the legislation was unambiguous so the district court did
not abuse its discretion by not abstaining from the exercise of its jurisdiction); see also Berman, 348 U.S.
at 31 (establishing the legislature, not the judiciary, declares what the public needs).
128 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (establishing that Congress has the power of eminent domain
takings because they have the duties of a state's policing power in the District of Columbia); see also
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240 (ruling the "public use" requirement is coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign's police power).
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party, the Court here did nothing new. However, the Kelo ruling is novel and
troubling in its expansion of what constitutes a public purpose.
In Berman, the Court was faced with a situation where the
neighborhood at issue suffered from extreme poverty, conditions of blight
and numerous public health and safety hazards. 2 9 The taking was necessary
to ameliorate the poor conditions and a direct public benefit accrued with the
taking. 30 In Midkiff, a direct public benefit was achieved by the transfer
itself since the existing harm, the land oligopoly, would then cease.'13  As
discussed above, the Kelo taking achieved no public purpose in and of itself.
It was necessary to defer to the legislature's judgment that some public
benefit would occur at some point in the future, after direct private benefit
(to the developers) had already been achieved. That this benefit be purely
economic in scope would be sufficient to withstand the Court's scrutiny.
Kelo therefore moves beyond earlier precedent and expands "public
use" to include any future indirect economic benefit to the community.
32
Application is but one of the numerous problems that arise. By expanding
the "public use" concept to encompass such a boundless and vague body of
activity, the Court gives lower courts no effective test or method by which to
judge future challenges to eminent domain exercise. By continuing down
this slippery slope of "public use" expansion, the Court offers us very little
indication of any limit, short of echoing the standard refrain that takings for
purely private benefit are invalid.
The Kelo verdict also further deteriorates property rights to a
position of marked inferiority to the other "fundamental" rights of life and
liberty noted in the Fifth Amendment.' 33  While property rights had
previously been under constant threat of a government taking for public use,
Kelo increases the threat by allowing gang attacks by local governments and
private developers seeking increased tax revenue, revitalized downtown
areas and higher profits.
129 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 27 (explaining that the Act being challenged was meant to protect the
public from substandard housing and blighted areas).
130 Id. at 29.
131 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
132 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-84 (rejecting the narrow test for "public use" and accepting
economic development in the future as a legitimate "public use" purpose in legislation for eminent domain
takings).
133 "No person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law...
U.S . CONST. amend. V. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor notes that securing the right to property is
one of the "great objects of government," which acknowledges the lowered position of property fights in
the post-Lochner era while still giving them significant strength. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 302 (1934)).
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Finally, Kelo exacerbates the problems of the poor and racial
minorities by tipping the balance of power further towards rich private
developers. In the urban renewal craze, the spoils will disproportionately fall
to wealthy development interests, the loss to the poor minorities. Although
there are additional critiques of the Kelo decision,134 it is sufficient here to
note that very few Federal limitations on the eminent domain power now
exist.
VII. Examining the Implications by Focusing on Post-Katrina New Orleans
Before continuing the discussion of where the recent eminent
domain jurisprudence leaves us, it may be helpful to first lay out a situation
which will demonstrate some of the most troubling implications of the recent
line of cases. This section focuses on rebuilding efforts in New Orleans as it
recovers from the disastrous flooding caused by Hurricane Katrina. With
many abandoned or vacant properties still languishing in neighborhoods all
over the city, urban redevelopment is an issue of extreme importance. As
part of the redevelopment process, local and state officials must attempt to
balance two opposing voices: one arguing for the protection of property
rights so that those who desire to rebuild their own homes may do so as
personal resources allow, and the other claiming that certain rights of the few
must be sacrificed in favor of immediate progress so that New Orleans as a
whole can successfully rebuild.
In response to Kelo, Louisiana voters passed a constitutional
amendment ("Amendment No. 5") that forbids use of eminent domain when
the condemned property would be immediately transferred to private
hands.1 35 This restriction on local and state expropriation powers should
serve to assuage some of the fears residents have of losing their homes in
redevelopment schemes. Indeed, some proponents of the measure may argue
that eminent domain can no longer be abused in Louisiana. However,
Amendment No. 5 is by no means complete protection. First, it has no
power to limit federal expropriation powers. Thus, federal agencies such as
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Housing
134 See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo is Not Good News for Local Planners and Developers, 22
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 803 (2006) (noting that Kelo and its aftermath will make it significantly more difficult
to engage in urban redevelopment throughout the United States).
135 Act of Sept. 30, 2006, No. 851, § 1, 2006 La. Sess. Law [hereinafter Amendment No. 5]
available at http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.aspdid=407125. In addition to
disallowing eminent domain actions that would directly transfer property to private entities, Amendment
No. 5 explicitly states that economic development, enhancement of tax revenue and incidental benefit to
the public shall not be considered a public purpose. Id.
408
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Authority of New Orleans (HANO, under federal control since 2002) have
free rein to use eminent domain under the expansive Kelo standard.1
36
Second, laws are not drafted without loopholes, and Amendment No. 5
contains provisions which could be manipulated by local governments if they
felt compelled to do SO. 137  Therefore, the following discussion of the
implications of Kelo in post-Katrina New Orleans is indeed relevant. 38 One
can see that New Orleans remains an area of concern for abuse of eminent
domain powers despite efforts to protect private property owners attempting
to rebuild.
This section begins with a brief description of the events surrounding
Hurricane Katrina, the subsequent flooding in New Orleans, and current
rebuilding efforts. Following that recap, the section continues with a
plausible analysis of a Takings Clause challenge to an eminent domain action
with application of the judicial framework set forth in Kelo. Through that
analysis, one can see problems both with the "public use" concept and the
"just compensation" concept of the Takings Clause.
A. Present Situation, in brief
In late August, 2005, Hurricane Katrina formed around the Bahamas
and grew to be a raging category 5 storm, the sixth-strongest Atlantic
hurricane ever recorded and the third-strongest hurricane to make landfall on
U.S. soil. 13 9 By the time the storm barreled into the Gulf Coast near the
136 HANO particularly has been active in post-Katrina New Orleans. The agency has condemned
(and planned demolition of) much of New Orleans' public housing. Gwen Filosa, Demolition in
Developments' Destiny, HANO Says, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 18, 2006 at Nat'l 1. In
replacing what was high-density, low-income public housing, it is not inconceivable that HANO would
attempt to build new public housing in other neighborhoods, possibly gaining the property through the use
of eminent domain.
137 Amendment No. 5 allows for the expropriation and removal of property that poses a threat to
public health or safety. Act of Sept. 30, 2006, No. 851, § 1, 2006 La. Sess. Law. The New Orleans
Redevelopment Agency (NORA) has publicly stated that it hopes the "public safety" provision will allow
for leeway in allowing it to use expropriation powers. Frank Donze, Low-Profile Agency Gains Blight-
Bust Powers, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 11, 2006 at Nat'l 1. Thus, non-blighted homes could
be expropriated under the theory that a neighborhood as a whole poses a public safety threat. A second
loophole can be seen in the "continuous public ownership" provision of Amendment No. 5. Act of Sept.
30, 2006, No. 851, § 1, 2006 La. Sess. Law. A local government entity could expropriate homes for a
period of "continuous public ownership" of only one or two years, then transfer the property to private
developers.
138 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (ruling economic development is a legitimate "public use" purpose
for eminent domain takings).
139 NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), DEP'T OF COMM.,
TECHNICAL REPORT 2005-01, HURRICANE KATRINA: A CLIMATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2005)
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Louisiana-Mississippi border, it had diminished in strength to a category 3
storm with approximately 125 mile per hour winds.' n Coastal Mississippi
saw perhaps the worst of the hurricane damage, with sustained 120 mile per
hour winds, 8-10 inches of rain and twenty-eight foot storm surges that
penetrated inland up to six miles in many areas. 14 1 The state registered 238
people dead, many more missing and billions of dollars in damages.
142
In Louisiana, especially, the greater New Orleans area, the damage
was slower. It seeped in with the flood waters, working slowly and
painfully, but left far greater destruction. New Orleans itself endured a
hurricane of only category 1 or 2 strength, but storm surges caused
widespread flooding and, consequently, much more damage. The
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet breached in several different places, flooding
much of New Orleans East, Saint Bernard Parish and the East Bank of
Plaquemines Parish. 143 Within the city proper, storm surges caused levees to
fail along the Industrial Canal, the London Avenue Canal and the 17th Street
Canal. 144 These breaches caused the majority of the city to flood. Despite
Mayor Nagin calling for the City's first ever mandatory evacuation on the
morning of the 28th, the effort was disorganized and an exercise in self-
help. 45 Those with sufficient resources and desire left, the rest stayed.
After the floodwaters receded, a massive clean-up and rebuilding
effort lay, and still lies, ahead. Eighty percent of New Orleans had been
under water and it took until September 20 for authorities to fully pump the
city dry. Moreover, just three days later, the storm surge from Hurricane
Rita caused a new breach in the hastily-repaired Industrial Canal levee that
led to a second bout of significant flooding. 146 Swaths of neighborhoods
near where the levees had breached, particularly in Lakeview and the Lower
Ninth Ward, were almost obliterated. Some homes were literally decimated
by the blasts of water; others were plucked from their foundations and
deposited blocks away in the middle of streets and on top of cars, boats or
(updated Aug. 2006), available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-report-2005Olz.pdf. Here,
strength is measured by the minimum central pressure of the storm. Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 4, 8.
142 Id. at 3.
143 See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, AND
THE Mississippi GULF COAST 219-26 (William Morrow, 2006) (describing the breaches of the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) and the Industrial Canal, and the disastrous results).
144 NOAA, supra note 139, at 4.
145 See BRINKLEY, supra note 143, at 187-98.
146 NOAA, supra note 139, at 4.
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other houses. 14 7  Those who were a bit luckier faced the task of gutting
homes beset with mold, rot and other decomposition resulting from the time
underwater followed by weeks, even months, of inaction and neglect. For
the wealthier displaced citizens, this chore meant a huge and emotional
expenditure of time, money and patience. For the many poor citizens, who
constituted the vast majority of the flooded areas, 48 the task was like trying
to climb Mount Everest. After being displaced for months in other areas of
the country and trying to get jobs and make ends meet there, securing enough
savings from which to live and rebuild or gut a house obviously represents a
near-impossible hurdle.
While some of these poorer residents had homeowner's insurance,
many did not have the resources to also invest in flood insurance. After the
storm, insurance companies often refused to honor claims made on
homeowner's insurance, asserting that they would only cover wind damage
and not flood damage. 149 Even when payouts were made, they were often a
fraction of what homes were worth or what repairs would cost. 5° The city,
meanwhile, bravely pressed on in its own rebuilding efforts by restoring
water and electricity in most areas, and attempting to resurrect a city that
many thought should be abandoned and left to the mercy of nature. In this
effort, it was imperative that the local government restore order and remove
public health and safety hazards to its best ability. City Ordinance No.
22356 requires that houses be gutted and dangerous mold spores be removed
by certain dates, depending on what zone of the city houses occupy.'15  In
addition, the city has a valid interest in improving abandoned areas of the
city which facilitate illicit behavior, drug transactions and violence. To this
end, the use of eminent domain can be a valuable tool in securing vast swaths
of land for the government as part of its comprehensive rebuilding plan. Yet,
do homeowners who have gutted their homes, removed public health and
147 Gwen Filosa, The Lower Ninth Ward Lies in Ruins, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 25,
2006, at Nat'l 1 (describing the lack of progress during the first year in rebuilding areas of New Orleans
that were hardest hit).
148 Of the flooded area in New Orleans, 80% of the residents were non-white and the average
annual household income in these areas was just $38,300. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NEW ORLEANS
AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 16 (2005), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051012_NewOrleans.htm.
149 See Jeffrey Meitrodt and Rebecca Mowbray, After Katrina, Pundits Criticized New Orleans,
Claiming Too Many Residents Had No Flood Insurance, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 19,
2006, at Nat'l I (describing insurers' stance on refusal to pay money for claims made under homeowners'
insurance policies).
150 Id.
151 New Orleans City Ordinance 22,356 (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://www.cityofno.com/
Resources/nusianceordinance.pdf.
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safety dangers from their property, and shown the intent to reestablish
themselves have a choice in the matter?
B. Applying Kelo
The line of eminent domain cases discussed earlier has established
the principle of giving broad deference to local government in its
determinations of whether the use of eminent domain is proper and
justified. 52 In Kelo, the Court stressed the scope and comprehensiveness of
the development plan in holding that only narrow judicial review was
proper. 53 The local government in New Orleans would undoubtedly receive
the same deference if a comprehensive redevelopment plan were subject to
court review.
The high level of national media attention in the aftermath of Katrina
has meant that nearly every decision in the rebuilding process is closely
scrutinized. City officials have gone to great lengths to ensure that proposals
allow for community input and criticism from local citizens. 1
54
To address the enormous task of formulating a rebuilding strategy,
Mayor Nagin formed the Bring New Orleans Back Commission, appointing
prominent members of New Orleans society to serve as members. The
Commission brought in outside experts, gathered volumes of information
and made comprehensive, deliberated, and specific recommendations to the
Mayor in the form of lengthy reports. 155 In addition to that effort, the City
Council paid $2.9 million to hire professional planners, who were tasked
with delivering a broader and more detailed city-wide planning effort after
the Commission's report was widely criticized. 56  Based on these
assessments by urban planning experts, the government of New Orleans
could decide to take various houses, or blocks of houses, and in turn transfer
them to developers with plans to build new condominiums. With this
amount of deliberation, planning, and public exposure, it is reasonable to
152 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (stating that the role of judicial review of legislative determination
of valid purpose is narrow); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240-41 (noting that the Court will not substitute their
judgment for that of the legislature); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482 (noting that the Court will afford the
legislature "broad latitude" in deciding public purpose).
153 Kelo, 545 U.S at 482.
15 Mayor Nagin has held numerous town meetings that allow for local citizens to voice concerns
and frustrations with the government's actions. See James Varney, Town Meeting Style Curbed, Mayor's
Sessions to Get Some Structure, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 17, 2005, at Metro 1.
155 See Frank Donze, Rebuild, but at Your Own Risk, Nagin Says; Recommendations from BNOB
Come with Warnings and Worries, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 20, 2006, at Nat'l 1 (noting the
release of the Commission's final report on recovery strategy and Mayor Nagin's reactions).
156 Gwen Filosa, N.O. Neighborhood Plans Revealed, but Total Price Tag Exceeds $2 Billion,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 24, 2006, at Metro 1.
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assume a court would find an eminent domain decision not to be irrational,
and therefore deserving of broad deference.
C. Public Use
Once a Court decides to give a legislative decision broad deference,
the constitutional analysis turns on whether the taking and subsequent
redevelopment serves a "public purpose."'157 Since the Kelo decision, this
standard could be met by a redevelopment plan that includes any indirect
economic benefit to the community. 158 Many neighborhoods in New Orleans
could be at risk of being lost through use of eminent domain. As an
example, the Lower Ninth Ward in eastern New Orleans sustained perhaps
the most Katrina damage due to a breach in the Industrial Canal. 59 While
many houses sustained irreparable damage (as described above), the
neighborhood is taking the slow steps necessary to rebuild. Many houses
have been demolished, leaving empty lots, but others have been gutted and
residents are beginning their lives anew in the neighborhood. 160 While some
properties have been abandoned since the storm, making them public health
and safety risks, many others have been rebuilt to the point where they could
not be considered blighted. These non-blighted houses, after so much work
was done to rebuild them after the storm, could be lost through eminent
domain.
A plan to replace this historic residential neighborhood with new
condominiums would undoubtedly meet the public purpose standard
expressed in Kelo. High-end condominiums would provide badly needed
housing for New Orleans, increase the city's property tax revenues, and, if a
successful venture, give the developers increased profits which would
'trickle down' to other levels of society, an indirect economic benefit.' 6' As
was the case with New London in Kelo, the city of New Orleans is in need of
157 Kelo, 545 U.S at 480.
158 Id. at 483-84. If one subscribes to Kennedy's view as noted in his concurrence, a court would
also review the plan to assure against any impermissible favoritism towards particular private parties. Id.
at 493.
159 See Gwen Filosa, The Lower 9th Ward Lies in Ruins, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug.
25, 2006 at Nat'l I (describing disastrous conditions nearly one year after Hurricane Katrina and efforts
by some residents to rebuild).
16 Id.
161 See, e.g., Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving "Public
Use" as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 54
DRAKE L. REV. 171, 207-08 (2005) (discussing the "trickle down" benefits in economic development
takings).
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"economic rejuvenation,"' 162 and a newly constructed condominium could
reasonably factor into that equation. Because the new condos could serve a
"public purpose," a plan to expropriate the Lower Ninth Ward neighborhood,
in whole or in part, would be deemed a constitutionally valid taking.
D. Just Compensation
An additional troubling issue involved in a situation such as the one
described above involves the second prong of the Takings Clause: just
compensation. The Court has generally held that using the fair market value
at the time of the taking is the correct method of determining just
compensation.1 63 In a neighborhood as devastated as the Lower Ninth Ward,
the value of the homes which have been rebuilt would still be nowhere near
their pre-Katrina values. The lack of a vibrant community feel post-Katrina,
the neighborhood's below-sea level elevation, and the reasonable fear of a
future levee breach are all factors contributing to significantly depressed real
estate values. 164 In those cases where the houses suffered irreparable damage
or were completely destroyed, the fair market value of the remaining
property is next to nothing. 165 Even in cases where the houses were not so
severely damaged and costly repairs were made, the fair market value of
162 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84 (holding that the City's program of economic rejuvenation
unquestionably served a public purpose).
163 See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("'Just compensation,' we
have held, means in most cases the fair market value of the property on the date it is appropriated.");
United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961) (citing United States v. Miller, 317
U.S. 369, 374 (1943)) ("The guiding principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the owner for the
property interest taken .... In many cases this principle can readily be served by the ascertainment of fair
market value-'what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller."'). But see United States v.
Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) ("[W]hen market value has been too difficult to
find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned
and applied other standards . . . . [T]he dominant consideration always remains the same: What
compensation is 'just' both to an owner whose property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill?"
(footnote omitted)).
164 See Gordon Russell, Uptown Assessments to Rocket Higher: Property Owners Get Near 40%
Increase, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 28, 2006 at Metro 1 (noting that property values in areas
above sea level have increased while values of homes below sea level have decreased).
165 In fact, one could envision a situation where a property actually had a net negative value. As
part of its redevelopment plan, the city could itself perform the task of repairing a house to the point of no
longer constituting a health or safety hazard, or contract for a private company to perform this service.
Coupling a low fair market value for the lot and an expensive bill for bringing the property into
compliance with City Ordinance No. 22356, it is conceivable that the net value would actually be a
negative number. Thus, an eminent domain action could actually result in a homeowner losing title to his
property and owing additional money to the city.
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such property, in the shadow of an unreliable levee, would also be much
lower as a result of the storm.
16 6
Yet, it would be no surprise if the Court were to uphold an eminent
domain action that awarded only the minimum fair market value of property
in rebuilding neighborhoods in New Orleans. The Court has hinted that
using fair market value to determine just compensation is not a controlling
standard, and other methods may be used if fair market value is not easily
determined, or its application would result in "manifest injustice." 167  The
fact that the Army Corps of Engineers has accepted responsibility for the
failure of the levees indicates that a government entity was at least partially
to blame for the situation in which thousands of New Orleanians currently
find themselves. 168  By mistakenly trusting the government, many citizens
are currently homeless or left with only the shells of what used to be their
homes. This fact suggests that just compensation at current fair market value
would, in fact, be a manifest injustice. The Court's trend towards extreme
deference to legislative decisions made at the local, state and federal levels of
government implies, however, that the current Court would uphold an
eminent domain action upon finding a valid public purpose, even if just
compensation were limited to fair market value.
One can see that the protection offered by the Court in eminent
domain actions has dwindled over the last fifty years. In fact, some now
view the Takings Clause simply as a conditional "if-then" process. 169 If the
government effects a transfer, then it must give just compensation. Viewing
the clause this way voids any meaningful limiting principles contained
within the "public purpose" phrase. As shown above, the Court has moved
progressively towards this interpretation, expanding the definition of public
166 As noted before, many homeowners did not have home insurance. Others who did have
insurance were often given severely reduced payments on their claims due to insurance companies'
determinations that homeowners insurance covered only hurricane damage, not flood damage. See Jeffrey
Meitrodt & Rebecca Mowbray, After Katrina, Pundits Criticized New Orleans, Claiming Too Many
Residents Had No Flood Insurance. In Fact, Few Communities were Better Covered, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 19, 2006 at Nat'l I (stating that some insurers were paying nothing on
homeowners' claims).
167 United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
168 See John Schwartz, Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at
Al (describing admissions in a 6,000 page report released by the Army Corps of Engineers that the New
Orleans levee system contained a chain of design and construction flaws).
169 Justice Kennedy has equated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to a conditional
limitation. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Clause operates
as a conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.").
See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
314 (1987) (stating that the Takings Clause "does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead
places a condition on the exercise of that power").
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use almost to a point where the words contain no meaning and impose no
limit on government action. One need not look far to imagine a situation that
illustrates the grave and unfair implications of such an expansive
interpretation of the Takings Clause. Thousands of property owners in and
around New Orleans could face the very real and troubling consequences of
the current interpretation in the years to come. Therefore, if the Takings
Clause no longer protects property owners against desperate, irrational and
unfair government expropriation, we must locate protections elsewhere in the
Constitution.
VIII. Equal Protection Analysis
Though many white New Orleans residents were affected by the
flooding, the vast majority of flood-prone neighborhoods were inhabited by
blacks. To be sure, historically white neighborhoods, such as Lakeview,
sustained costly damage. However, these neighborhoods were home to
families who generally had higher incomes than their flooded counterparts in
majority-black areas of the city.1 70 With more financial resources available
to them, many Lakeview residents were able to rebuild more quickly. In
contrast, majority-black neighborhoods have suffered more from months of
neglect due to insufficient resources to begin the rebuilding process.171
Given a slower rebuilding process in these areas, combined with a weaker
political voice, it follows that these majority black neighborhoods would be
more susceptible to an eminent domain action.172 In situations such as this,
170 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST,
A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 7 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.edulmetro/pubs/
20051012_NewOrleans.htm. Specifically, the Lakeview neighborhood, only 6.3% non-white, had an
average annual household income of $63,178, according to the 2000 census. In contrast, the average
annual household income for blacks in the city was only $21,000. Id. For flooded areas in Orleans Parish
that were a majority non-white, the average annual household income was $38,300. Id. at 16.
171 To be clear, many residents of the poorer neighborhoods in New Orleans have benefited from
the generosity of volunteers working with organizations such as Common Ground and ACORN to assist
in gutting houses and removing safety and health hazards. Though a clear sign of progress, these efforts
are nowhere near comprehensive and thousands of residents are left to rely solely on whatever resources
they may have. According to ACORN's website, the organization has assisted in gutting over 1,600
homes, yet thousands of homes remain on this one organization's waiting list alone.
http://www.acom.org/index.php?id=10223.
172 See PEIRCE F. LEWIS, NEW ORLEANS: THE MAKING OF AN URBAN LANDSCAPE 95 (University
of Virginia Press 2d ed., 2003) [hereinafter Lewis, URBAN LANDSCAPE] (noting a history of under-
representation of African-Americans in "Level 1 Leadership" in New Orleans). Indeed, New Orleans first
elected a black mayor in 1978, Ernest "Dutch" Morial. He was later followed in office by fellow African-
Americans Marc Morial and C. Ray Nagin. This very recent trend towards increased African-American
representation in local government now faces reversal as fewer African-Americans are able to return to
the city. See, e.g., New Orleans City Council News Release, available at http://www.nocitycouncil.com/
shownews.asp?cid=412 (noting that New Orleans' African-American population has decreased from 67%
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the expropriation attempt may be challenged through the use of the Equal
Protection Clause.
This section begins with the Equal Protection Clause, its
constitutional roots, and the current judicial framework of analysis for claims
made under the clause. The section continues with an exploration into the
unfortunate and deep history of racial discrimination in New Orleans. This
history, as well as some recent occurrences fit well into the Arlington
Heights factor analysis of inferring discriminatory intent by looking at the
totality of the facts. Although Arlington Heights places a very high
evidentiary burden on those bringing and equal protection claim, the analysis
contained in this section sets forth a plausible argument that the use of
eminent domain in some instances could have equal protection implications.
A. Current Law on Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment states: "[n]o State shall.. . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 1 73 Congress
and the states originally adopted the Constitutional Amendment to prohibit
states from continuing to discriminate against recently freed blacks following
the Civil War.174 Although this provision does not explicitly apply to the
federal government, the Court has construed the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause as containing an equal protection component. 75  Equal
protection typically applies to discrimination against an identifiable class of
individuals; however, the Court has held that equal protection challenges




The Court has developed the following test in assessing the merit of
an equal protection claim based on race. In making a prima facie case, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the law has had a disproportionate impact on an
of the city's total population before the storm to 47% after). The problems of under-representation
became evident in the first post-Katrina mayoral election, as many displaced citizens argued that the
election was carried out according to racially exclusionary practices. See Cain Burdeau, Judge Won't
Delay New Orleans Mayoral Vote, Groups Argue Many Displaced Residents Unable to Vote, MONTEREY
COUNTY HERALD, Mar. 28, 2006 (noting that the NAACP and other advocacy groups called the absentee
voting plan amounted to the equivalent of a poll tax).
173 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
174 San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co. (Railroad Tax Cases), 13 F. 722, 740 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (noting
that the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to "protect the newly-made citizens of the
African race in their freedom").
175 See, e.g., Washington, 426 U.S. at 239 ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
contains an equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating
between individuals or groups.").
176 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
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identifiable group and, (2) lawmakers had discriminatory intent or purpose
when passing the law. 77 In other words, for the Court to apply heightened
scrutiny when reviewing an equal protection challenge, the elements of
disproportionate impact and discriminatory intent must both be present.
Proving that a legislature or government body has intentionally discriminated
can be a difficult task. Although facial discrimination has occurred in the
past, 178  the Court held in Washington v. Davis that "an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts .. .,,079 The "totality of the relevant facts" language is purposefully
vague and essentially requires the Court to analyze a plaintiff's assertions in
their proper context and on a case-by-case basis. In Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.' , the Court notes the following
factors as evidentiary sources in determining intent: historical background of
the situation and the law, specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision, departures from the normal procedural sequence,
substantive departures in the decision-making process, and legislative
history. 81
The Arlington Heights factors, though not all-inclusive, provide a
framework through which a plaintiff can present evidence of discriminatory
intent when making an equal protection claim. To be clear, the plaintiff
carries a heavy evidentiary burden. 82  However, the Court has upheld
challenges to facially neutral laws when the context of their enactment
indicates a discriminatory purpose and the law produces a discriminatory
177 See Washington, 426 U.S. at 240 (holding that it is a basic equal protection principle that the
invidious quality of a law challenged as racially discriminatory must be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose).
178 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding a West Virginia law limiting
juries to adult white males to be an equal protection violation).
179 Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
180 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. had contracted
to purchase a tract of land in order to build racially integrated low and moderate income housing filed a
suit alleging that local authorities' refusal to change the tract from a single-family to a multi-family
classification was a violation of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that discriminatory intent doesn't
have to be express or obvious on the face of the law, it can also be inferred from the relevant facts. The
Court held however that racial discrimination need not be the sole basis for the law, but must be a
motivating factor. In this case, the discriminatory intent was not sufficiently evidenced by racially
disproportionate impact, historical background, specific prior events, departures from usual procedures, or
contemporaneous statements of the decision makers involved. Id.181 Id. at 267.
182 In Arlington Heights itself, the Court ultimately did not find that petitioners met their burden of
showing discriminatory intent and the Village of Arlington Heights' refusal to re-zone property to allow
construction of low-income housing was upheld. Id. at 269.
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effect.' 83 In Rogers v. Lodge,'84 for instance, the Court struck down an at-
large county election system, holding that the system was being maintained
for racially discriminatory purposes.185  The Court determined this by
considering the proven disparate impact and the totality of the plaintiffs'
circumstantial evidence of intent, including a history of depressed socio-
economic status of blacks, exclusion from the political process,
discriminatory use of public monies, and a failure of the political process to
address the needs of the black community.
186
Once a plaintiff succeeds in presenting a prima facie claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, the burden shifts to the state to rebut the claim.
Essentially, the state must only show that, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the same action would have been taken absent any intentionally
discriminatory motive, If the state successfully rebuts the evidence against
it, the Court's analysis will proceed under mere rationality review; i.e., if the
policy bears a rational relationship to any conceivable legitimate state
interest, it is constitutional. If the state cannot meet its burden, the Court
applies strict scrutiny to the government action, which if not always "fatal in
fact"'187 is more often than not so.
B. Equal Protection in New Orleans
We will continue with the hypothetical, but not implausible, situation
of an eminent domain action for the condemnation of unblighted houses in
the severely damaged Lower Ninth Ward neighborhood. To construct an
equal protection argument, we must begin by showing that the taking would
183 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (striking down a provision in Alabama's
Constitution because its original enactment was motivated by discriminatory intent and the provision had
had a racially discriminatory impact since its adoption).
184 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) Rogers involved a challenge to an at-large election
scheme for a large rural county in Georgia. Id. at 614. The Court found that the at-large system was
being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population. Id. at
622. The Court based its reasoning on the fact that blacks were a substantial majority of the population in
the county, yet a distinct minority of the registered voters. Id. at 623-24. In support of its holding, the
Court noted that no black individual ever had been elected to the county commission. Id. In addition,
blacks had been excluded from participating in the political process, in party affairs, and in primary
elections. Id. at 625. The Court therefore held that an at-large election system was unconstitutional
because there was sufficient proof of a discriminatory purpose behind the election system. Id. at 627.
185 See id. (affirming District Court's findings that the at-large system was "maintained for
invidious purposes").
186 Id. at 624-26.
187 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (noting that many perceive an
application of strict scrutiny to mean a law is automatically struck down, but that this is not always the
case).
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have a disparate impact on a protected class of people. Before the storm, the
Lower Ninth Ward was an almost exclusively African American
neighborhood, having a 99.5% non-white population. 188  Indeed, more
generally, the flooded areas of the city as a whole were 80% non-white.'
89
Wealth distribution is also a concern, due to the fact that eminent
domain actions often target low-income, minority urban neighborhoods. 190
In New Orleans, the economic disparity between races closely parallels the
economic differences between those living within a flood zone and those
living outside of one. For example, in Orleans Parish the average income of
inhabitants of flooded areas was only $38,263, compared to $55,300 for
those living in areas not flooded.' 91 In addition, 84% of the city's poor
population was black and almost all extreme-poverty neighborhoods in the
city were predominately black. 192 Of the forty-nine extreme poverty tracts
existing in the city before the flood, thirty-eight of those tracts were flooded.
Virtually all of the residents in those tracts were black.
193
Thus, while flooding in New Orleans was widespread, it
disproportionately affected African Americans. Because the flooded areas
were also predominantly low-income, residents need more time to rebuild,
and will more likely become targets for the use of eminent domain. As the
above statistics show, nearly any eminent domain action in a flooded area of
New Orleans would disproportionately affect blacks, a group that triggers
heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis.
Having shown that a taking in such a neighborhood as the Lower
Ninth Ward would have disparate impact on blacks, we move on to the
difficult task of presenting evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of
the government. As noted above, one of the factors considered in Arlington
Heights is the historical background of the situation surrounding the eminent
domain action. In the case of New Orleans, there is a lengthy history of
188 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NEW ORLEANS AFrER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST,
A PLAN FOR THE FuTURE 7 (2005).
189 Id. at 17. It should be noted that this statistic accounts for only those citizens within the
boundaries of the city proper. Other statistics may instead refer to the New Orleans metropolitan area.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, this area includes a total of eight parishes: Jefferson, Plaquemines,
St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, St. Tammany, St. James and Orleans (of which the City of
New Orleans is a part). U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000. Also note that the Brookings Institution's
definition of the metro area does not include St. James parish. Id. at 3.
190 See Pritchett, supra note 41 (noting that political and institutional elites use urban renewal
programs, and eminent domain actions through which they are carried out, to "reduce minority
populations and entrench racial segregation").
191 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NEW ORLEANS AFrER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST,
A PLAN FOR THE FUTuRE 17 (2005).
192 Id. at 6.
193 Id. at 17. The Brookings Report defines "extreme poverty tracts" to be areas where at least
40% of the population lives below the poverty line.
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discrimination, with segregation become increasingly pronounced in recent
years.
Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville founded New Orleans in 1718
as a part of the French empire in America. 194 He chose the site because of its
position as a natural levee (an elevated piece of ground due to deposit of
river silt) near the mouth of the Mississippi. Its surroundings were desolate,
uninhabitable swamplands and nature therefore confined the city to a small
footprint. t95 New Orleans occupied an extremely strategic position on the
Mississippi, governing trade into the interior of the new country while also
serving as a window both to Europe and Latin America. Despite its
fortuitous placement and status as a trade center, the city's population did not
press its natural boundaries until the early twentieth century. The city began
to expand with A. Baldwin Wood's invention in the 1920s of a heavy duty
pump capable of draining the swampland surrounding New Orleans.
196
Expansion occurred slowly at first, but finally exploded after the Second
World War. 19 7 This expansion occurred mainly towards the Northwest of
New Orleans proper, upriver of the French Quarter and into Jefferson Parish.
The incoming residents were almost exclusively white.
198
Antebellum New Orleans was a slave society. Despite its inherent
differences from the rest of the South, it was, in fact, a Southern city. 199 As
such, black families lived close to the white families for whom they worked.
Affluent whites lived along the larger boulevards, while the poor (but not
exclusively black) lived along the alleys and smaller streets between the
boulevards. 200 Thus, while New Orleans had one of the highest proportions
of African American populations of any major U.S. city, it was also one of
the least segregated geographically. 2°1 Yet as the population grew and the
economy changed, blacks were forced to live where they could. Initially,
this meant sparse and discontinuous settlement in the backswamps further
194 LEWIS, supra note 172, at 37-38.
195 Id. at 37. The natural levee that formed amid the swampland was in a bend of the Mississippi,
with high ground occupying a swath of land in a crescent shape, thus the nickname "Crescent City."
196 Id. at 65-66. In an ironic twist, it was the wood pump which Dutch engineers studied to help
drain some of the lowest lying areas of the Netherlands. After Katrina, many people pointed to the
Netherlands successful scheme as a model on which to base the design of a successful levee system in
New Orleans.
197 Id. at 78-79.
198 Id. at 66-67, 78-79.
199 Given New Orleans' unique history as a French settlement and its isolation from British
colonial expansion, it maintained a defiant air of individuality. See LEWIS, supra note 172, at 15-16
(describing the unique aspects of New Orleans in comparison with the rest of the Southern United States).
200 Id. at 50-51.
201 Id. at 52.
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from the natural levees, lands actually below sea level. As population grew,
these settlements merged into one large "superghetto," what is now the
shallow bowl of central city and mid-city.2 °2
Black occupation of these backswamp areas was not voluntary; other
options simply did not exist. With real estate in the higher, older
neighborhoods beyond the means of poor families, they were forced to look
elsewhere. The Wood pump opened land upriver of the city, but mortgage
companies maintained openly discriminatory lending practices which
resulted in blacks essentially getting shut out of any opportunity to move
upriver into the recently drained land in Jefferson Parish.2 °3 In addition, the
Federal Housing Agency (FHA), which insured long-term mortgages,
advocated zoning and deed restrictions to bar racial minorities, and refused
to provide financing in communities where minorities lived.204 Because of
these FHA policies, developers and real estate agents simply refused to sell
to African Americans.2 °5  Although these practices have since been
discontinued, they serve as evidence of the Federal government's intent to
exclude blacks from these suburban New Orleans neighborhoods during the
pivotal years of their initial development.
Federal public housing and infrastructure projects have also further
inhibited black housing choices. In the 1930s and '40s, Orleans Parish and
the federal Works Progress Administration combined to complete a huge and
ambitious development known as Lakefront on Lake Pontchartrain, north of
the old city.2°6  The development, acquired at enormous expense to the
public, was originally planned to be made available for sale to both rich and
poor.207 However, amid public outcry that there were consistent and blatant
violations of the law during the auctioning process, the land ended up as one
of the wealthiest, and whitest, areas of the metropolitan area.208
The construction of new highways often occurs in areas where
political opposition is weakest. 2°9 Until very recently, blacks have not had
proportionate representation in local government. 210  As an example, the
202 Id. at 52.
203 Martha Mahoney, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in New
Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1274-75 (1990) (arguing that discriminatory lending practices were part
of a systematic, government-organized policy of discrimination towards blacks).
204 Kenneth T. Jackson, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES
207-08 (1985).
205 LEWIS, supra note 172, at 67.
206 Id. at 68-69.
207 Id. at 69. Indeed, Mayor Maestri went so far as to describe it the "poor man's project." Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 98.
210 See LEWIS, supra note 172, at 95 (noting that in 1970 blacks held only 3.6% of "Level I
Leadership" positions while constituting 45% of the overall population of New Orleans).
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Federal Highway Administration was forced to abandon its proposed
"Riverfront Expressway," near the French Quarter due to intense political
opposition from the affluent white.2 1 Yet, the department found it easy to
run Interstate 10 right down North Claiborne Avenue, "converting the main
street of New Orleans' biggest African American neighborhood from a




All of the above examples provide evidence of a history of
discrimination against African Americans in a variety of facets related to
housing. From the FHA's openly discriminatory practices in the early days
of expansion into Jefferson Parish to the placement of highways such that the
atmosphere of a nice black neighborhood is ruined, discrimination has been
widespread. This evidence of historical discrimination should weigh heavily
in favor of the plaintiff trying to prove discriminatory intent in a government
action.
A second body of evidence considered by the Arlington Heights
Court was the sequence of events leading to the challenged action and any
departures from the normal procedural sequence.1 3 In the case of an
eminent domain action for homes in the Lower Ninth Ward, there is ample
evidence of the local government attempting to bypass the normal due
process procedural protections. On December 28, 2005, residents and
homeowners in the Lower Ninth Ward filed with the Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans a Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive and Declaratory Relief.214 Petitioners'
Brief alleged that the Mayor of the City of New Orleans and his staff had
developed a plan to demolish 2,500 homes in the city, totally in ex parte
proceedings without consent of the owners, and absent any legal proceedings
beforehand.215 Defendants in the action (the Mayor and City of New
Orleans) did not deny the nature of the plan,216 and a consent judgment was
211 Id. at 90.
212 Id. at 98. The placement of 1-10 along N. Claiborne severely detracted from the value and the
attractiveness of the historically black Tremd neighborhood. According to 2000 U.S. Census data, the
Trem6lUafitte area of New Orleans had become 95.1% black with an average household income of
$19,479 and 56.9% of residents living in poverty. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NEW ORLEANS AFTER
THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 7 (2005).
213 See discussion, supra, pages 23-24.
214 Brief for Petitioner, Kirk v City of New Orleans, filed Dec. 28, 2005 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Petitioners' Brief]. See also Gwen Filosa, Gordon Russell, Bruce Eggler, Lower Ninth Ward
Activists Chase Away Bulldozer Crew, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 6, 2006 (noting the nature
of the lawsuit filed and the resulting court-sanctioned agreement).
215 Petitioners' Brief, supra note 214, at 4.
216 Id. The fact that Mayor Nagin is also African-American does not immunize his actions from
Equal Protection Clause scrutiny. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) (rejecting the
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2007)
reached whereby both parties agreed that no demolitions would occur until a
217scheduled hearing.
This example alone is ample evidence of procedural abnormality.
However, it gets worse. The day before the court hearing when the court-
sanctioned agreement was to expire, the City prepared to begin demolition of
homes in the Lower Ninth Ward, in clear violation of the agreement.21 8 Had
homeowners not been alerted of the scheduled demolitions, and had they not
taken physical steps to stop the bulldozers, the demolitions would have
continued without the homeowners' consent and without any legal
proceeding. 219 Thus, ample proof of departure from normal procedural
sequence can be added to the body of evidence inferring discriminatory
intent.
Though the Court in Arlington Heights lists some factors that, if
proved, could lead to a proper inference of discriminatory intent, it explicitly
states that the list is not exhaustive.220 Another factor that may be relevant in
this case is what plans the government has for subsequent use of the property
at issue. A taking that condemns the property owned by a protected class
only to then transfer that property to another group could contain indications
of discriminatory intent. In fact, the majority in Kelo relied heavily on the
plans for subsequent use in order to find that the taking, specifically due to
the economic boon the subsequent use would bring, was constitutional.2 If
subsequent use of the property is a proper issue for the Court to consider, we
may examine the subsequent use here to find indications of any
discriminatory intent.
Recent action by the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO)
shows a trend of demolishing low-income, majority black housing to make
presumption that, in the context of racial discrimination in the workplace, an employer will not
discriminate against members of his own race).
217 Consent Judgment, No. 2005-1347 1, Civil Dist. Ct. for Parish of Orleans (Dec. 28, 2005) (on
file with author).
218 See Gwen Filosa, Gordon Russell, Bruce Eggler, Lower Ninth Ward Activists Chase Away
Bulldozer Crew, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 6, 2006 (describing the efforts of homeowners
necessary to physically stop the demolitions from occurring before the hearing).
219 Id.
220 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 ("The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to
be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed.").
221 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474-75, 483-84 (describing the economic benefits the city's redevelopment
plan would bring and holding that the plan serves a public purpose). Notably, Justice O'Connor's dissent
seemingly rejects this emphasis on subsequent use. She distinguishes Kelo from Berman and Midkiffon
the grounds that, in those cases, the taking itself accomplished the public purpose whereas in Kelo, the
Court was required to look beyond the taking itself to the subsequent use in order to justify the taking as
serving a public purpose. Id. at 499-501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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room for "mixed-income" urban developments. 222  Though not
discriminatory on its face, these actions have a disproportionate impact on
low income African American families. The demolition of the St. Thomas
public housing project provides an indication of the results of recent attempts
at "mixed income" housing. Originally constructed in the 1930's as public
housing for whites (at the time, the federal government funded segregated
housing), the St. Thomas projects became almost 100% black due to the
"white flight" in the 1950s and '60s.223 It was a model for public housing:
solid construction with a pleasant neighborhood atmosphere.224 With its
removal, the city destroyed over 1,500 units of low-income housing and
replaced them with only 200 comparable units, the rest being high-end
condos.225 Though St. Thomas had been near full capacity at the time of
demolition, only 100 units of the housing that replaced it were occupied by
displaced St. Thomas residents.226 The disproportionate racial effects here
are clear. Destroying 1,500 units of low-income housing, occupied almost
exclusively by African Americans, and replacing those units with only 200
comparable ones creates a dearth of housing for low-income residents.
The trend of destroying low-income housing has continued after the
storm. At a time when residents were in dire need of affordable housing to
allow them to return and rebuild, HANO and HUD decided to raze 3,500
additional public housing units in the city. 227 Officials decided to proceed
with the demolition plan despite the fact that many of the units needed only
minor renovations and amid public outcry and lawsuits claiming that the plan
was racially discriminatory.228 Like the St. Thomas redevelopment, the new
developments at issue would be constructed in partnership with private
investors and would represent more "mixed-income" housing containing far
fewer low-income units than before.229
As the figures noted above make clear, decreasing low-income
housing in New Orleans will affect many more blacks than whites. In
222 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 172, at 134-35 (describing the city's demolition of the St. Thomas
public housing project in the late 1990's in order to construct a "mixed-income" development with
drastically fewer low-income housing units).
223 Id. at 134-35.
224 Id.
225 Sara Gran, Nobody Home, Agencies in Charge of Housing New Orleans' Poor Prefer Not to,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 30, 2006 at B5.
226 Id.
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addition, the replacement high-end condos presumably are occupied by those
in the higher income bracket, which is disproportionately made up of whites.
Therefore when looking at subsequent use, an eminent domain action to
condemn housing in the Lower Ninth Ward would have a disproportionate
effect on African Americans. It would demolish housing historically owned
by blacks to make room for "mixed income" housing, which New Orleans
has shown to mean high-end condos with an insufficient number of low-
income units included.
Noting the recent trends in urban development in New Orleans and
any plans for subsequent use in our hypothetical eminent domain action,
evidence of plans of a "mixed income" development could contribute to a
circumstantial showing of discriminatory intent against African Americans.
When presented with the option of re-opening affordable housing that would
benefit thousands of poor African Americans, local and federal officials
chose instead to pursue a strategy that would instead benefit private
investors, higher-income residents and government coffers in the form of
increased property tax revenue. Given the racial make-up of the city, those
benefiting from the redevelopment plans will be mainly higher-income,
majority white residents while those suffering will be almost exclusively
African American. From these facts, one can argue (and indeed, attorneys
have) that HANO-HUD's conscious decisions to shut out poor African
Americans from inhabitable housing in order to make way for more
profitable real estate ventures rises to intentional discrimination.23 °
Taken together, the factors of evidence of racially discriminatory
intent could combine to make a colorable claim of equal protection.
Following the Arlington Heights analysis, an eminent domain action in the
Lower Ninth Ward would certainly have a disparate impact on blacks. An
inference of racially discriminatory intent is reasonable when considering the
evidence noted above of blatant and systematic racially discriminatory
housing practices by the FHA and local officials, a departure from the
normal procedural sequence in this case, and the disproportionate harm
suffered by blacks due to subsequent use as "mixed income" housing.
Therefore, one can see that the situation could arise where an eminent
domain action, valid under the current standard, could in fact be in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
230 Gwen Filosa, Demolition is Developments' Destiny, HANO says, NEW ORLEANS TiMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 18, 2006 at 1 (noting that plaintiffs in a civil rights lawsuit against HANO-HUD depict
the demolition plan as racist).
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IX. Substantive Due Process
Whether or not one would succeed in an Equal Protection claim, the
situation from purely a Takings Clause analysis seems troubling. The Fifth
Amendment states: "No person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of the law .. .. 3 In contrast to procedural
due process, which is directly implicated by the text of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the federal courts consistently have read into the
phrase a guarantee against any government action that may be substantively
unfair or unreasonable. The following section details substantive due
process implications of an eminent domain action under our running
hypothetical. First, this section explores a substantive due process analysis
under current judicial standards. The second part explores the presence of
substantive due process notions within Takings Clause analysis, and
proposes a realignment of property rights in eminent domain actions.
A. Current Law on Substantive Due Process Peer
Concerning New Orleans, poor homeowners should have as much of
a right to rebuild as their financially superior counterparts, and they should
not suffer additional injury simply because they do not have the resources to
rebuild as quickly. A government facilitated taking which would give the
property to another private entity to redevelop, all under the guise of
promoting economic revival in the city, would offend traditional notions of
fairness. In addition, the issue of what constitutes just compensation
implicates fairness considerations. A government giving only fair market
value, which would be next to nothing for a severely damaged home located
in the shadow of a faulty levee system, would arguably be fundamentally
unfair. A government expropriating an individual's property while also
billing him for clean up work would unquestionably be unfair. This
conclusion is ever easier to reach when one considers that the federal
government itself has accepted at least partial blame for the levee breaches
that prompted the massive property damage.232
231 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
232 See John Schwartz, Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006 at
Al (describing admissions in a 6,000 page report released by the Army Corps of Engineers that the New
Orleans levee system contained a chain of design and construction flaws).
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Under substantive due process analysis, the Court applies strict
scrutiny in cases where fundamental rights are infringed. A law or
government action will be upheld under strict scrutiny only if the law serves
a compelling government interest and no reasonable alternative means of
accomplishing that interest exists.233 Thus, if strict scrutiny were applied to
an eminent domain action in the Lower Ninth Ward, there would be a strong
presumption against the validity of the action. While the city may be able to
show that reviving the economy in New Orleans is a compelling government
interest in order to assure the city's survival234, it would be extremely
difficult to show that no reasonable alternatives to the exercise of eminent
domain existed. Other parts of the city would present adequate sites, where
involuntarily taking the homes of people hoping to rebuild would not be an
issue. Additionally, market negotiation between private developers and
private homeowners is always an option and would avoid unnecessary, and
in this case unfair, government involvement. Thus, if property were
considered a fundamental right, it is likely that the eminent domain action in
our hypothetical situation would result in a violation of substantive due
process.235
We no longer live in an era where property rights are considered
fundamental, however. During the Lochner Era of the early 20th century, the
Court found that substantive due process protected against laws that
regulated economic relationships.236 For example, in Coppage v. Kansas, the
Court held that the right to contract was included in personal property rights,
233 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting a strict
scrutiny standard by stating that legislation aimed at discrete and insular minorities deserve a higher
standard of judicial review and should be exceptions to the presumption of constitutionality because
minorities lack the normal protections of the political process).
234 Numerous editorials following Katrina wondered if New Orleans was even worth repopulating.
See, e.g., Klaus Jacob, Time For a Tough Question: Why Rebuild?, WASH. POST at A25 (Sept. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2005/09/05/AR2005090501034.html
("It is time to face up to some geological realities and start a carefully planned deconstruction of New
Orleans."); Jack Shafer, Don't Refloat: The Case Against Rebuilding the Sunken City of New Orleans,
Slate.com, available at http://www.slate.conid/2125810 ("But it would be a mistake to raise the
American Atlantis. It's gone.").
235 The Court stated precisely this idea in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878). In dicta,
the Court stated "a statute which declares in terms, and without more, that the full and exclusive title of a
described piece of land, which is now in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would, if effectual,
deprive A. of his property without due process of law, within the meaning of the constitutional provision."
Id. at 102. Apart from being dicta, the Davidson decision also is problematic because it was handed down
before the Court's shift away from Lochner Era protection of economic rights as fundamental, and
therefore deserving of protection under substantive due process.
236 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-58 (1905) (holding that a law disallowing bakers
from working more than ten hours a day or sixty hours a week violated the substantive due process right
to contract).
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and was therefore protected by substantive due process. 37 This judicial
protection was short-lived, however, as the Great Depression prompted the
Court to adopt an increasingly deferential stance towards economic
regulations.238
In United States v. Carolene Products, the Court evoked the rational
basis test in upholding a law that impaired the right to contract. 239 Under this
test, the Court conducts a deferential review of the challenged law, upholding
it as long as the Court finds the legislature had some conceivable, rational
basis for enacting it.24° Although there has been a revival of substantive due
process jurisprudence in protecting certain unenumerated rights to privacy
241and personal autonomy, this revival has been limited to liberty interests.
Thus, after the Court's forceful repudiation of Lochner Era substantive due
process rights, it carefully began taking up certain liberty interests which do,
in fact, deserve substantive due process protection. To this day, fundamental
property rights have been left OUt. 242 Given economic and property rights
position in substantive due process analysis, rationality review of an eminent
domain action in post-Katrina New Orleans would, in all likelihood, pass the
Court's deferential review.
B. Untangling Substantive Due Process and Takings Clause Jurisprudence
The landscape of fundamental individual property rights currently
appears bleak. Two trends in Takings Clause jurisprudence merit attention.
First, the Court has expanded its use of the Takings Clause in considering
legal challenges affecting property. This has occurred most notably in the
237 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915).
238 This transition occurred in a number of ways in the late 1930s. For instance, in Nebbia v. New
York, the Court abandoned the strict scrutiny standard that it normally would have applied when it upheld
a New York law setting a minimum price for the sale of milk. See generally Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
239 See generally Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 144.
24 Id. at 152-54.
241 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that a law disallowing the use
of contraceptives interfered with the right to privacy in marriage, a violation of substantive due process
rights); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (affirming that blood relations have a
fundamental right to cohabitate); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that substantive due
process protected the right of consenting adults, including homosexuals, to engage in sexually intimate
behavior within their own homes)
242 The Court has not spoken to fundamental property rights as an aspect of substantive due
process jurisprudence since 1921 in Truax v. Corrigan. 257 U.S. 312 (1921). See generally Krotoszynski,
supra note 6 (discussing the evolution of fundamental property rights in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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arena of regulatory takings.243 Thus, the Court is more eager to locate
property rights under the Takings Clause umbrella rather than the substantive
due process umbrella. 244 Second, property rights in eminent domain cases
have consistently deteriorated as the Court has essentially read the "for
public use" limitation out of the Takings Clause.245 Thus, while the scope of
the Takings Clause has broadened, the level of its protection of individuals'
rights has diminished, reducing the Takings Clause to a conditional grant of
power to the government.246 Coupling this trend with the fact that property
rights have not been considered fundamental, and therefore not deserving of
substantive due process protection, property rights have essentially been left
to the whimsy of legislatures.
Post-Katrina New Orleans gives us a glimpse into how this neglect
could go wrong. The massive and widespread property damage following
Katrina, a combination of natural disaster and federal agency negligence, has
left thousands of property owners at greater risk than ever of having their
property taken for urban redevelopment. Poor minorities have
disproportionately suffered the brunt of the damage due to the intentional
decisions of government officials. Further, local government has both a long
and rich history of discriminatory practices in regards to minority housing.
Although an Equal Protection claim may succeed, it is by no means a sure
thing. Those homeowners who could face an eminent domain action deserve
protection from what would amount to a fundamentally unfair or arbitrary
action. Yet, neither the Takings nor Due Process Clauses would protect
those homeowners' property rights. In other words, the U.S. Constitution, as
it is currently interpreted, offers them no relief.
To address this dilemma, I propose reincorporating property rights
under the substantive due process umbrella in eminent domain challenges,
and restoring the fundamentality of property rights in these cases. In support
of this contention, the text of the U.S. Constitution itself incorporates
243 See, e.g., Nollan, 438 U.S. at 825; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); see also Krotoszynski , supra note 6, at 555 (noting
the broadening scope of the Takings Clause with respect to regulatory takings).
244 In fact, the Court recently attempted to further separate due process and takings jurisprudence.
In Lingle v. Chevron, the Court rejected using the "substantially advances" test in a regulatory takings
case, holding that the test "prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and...
has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence." Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005). See also
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (finding that all claims that a police officer has used
excessive force in an investigatory stop should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" standard rather than under the more generalized substantive due process approach).
245 See discussion, supra, at I.b.
246 See discussion, supra, at IV.a; Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("The clause operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as
it pays the charge.").
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property explicitly into its Due Process Clause of both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.247  It was clearly the Framers' intent to put
property interests on equal footing with life and liberty interests when due
process concerns are implicated.248  While the Court has recently attempted
to disconnect Takings Clause analysis from Due Process analysis, perhaps
the two were in fact not meant to be separated. Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Kelo--of crucial importance because it gives the majority
opinion its fifth vote-cautions that a more stringent standard of review may
be warranted in eminent domain actions that contain elements of
impermissible favoritism, again evoking the substantive due process concept
of fundamental fairness. 249 In light of the disturbing implications of the
current reading of the Takings Clause, as evidenced by the above discussion
of valid eminent domain actions in New Orleans, there are significant
substantive due process elements that should not be ignored.
In addition, the Court itself has struggled with separating the
concepts involved in takings and due process cases. Most notably, in
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, the Court could not come to full agreement as
to whether a retroactive health benefits funding scheme violated the Takings
Clause or the Due Process Clause.25 ° In the plurality opinion, Justice
O'Connor concludes that the funding scheme, though it does not present the
case of a "classic taking," was in fact a Takings Clause violation.2 5 1 In
invalidating the health benefits plan, the plurality makes numerous
references to notions of "substantial unfairness" and the disproportionate
impact of the retroactive nature of the legislation,2 2  As Professor
Krotoszynski argues, these phrases, though used in the context of a Takings
Clause analysis here, in fact imply an argument of fundamental fairness that
is more properly located in Due Process jurisprudence.253
247 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV §1.
248 See Krotoszynski, supra note 6, at 557 (citing William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New
Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 453 (1977)
(arguing that courts should afford property interests equal treatment with liberty interests in applying the
Due Process Clause)).
249 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (indicating that some private transfers may
involve government acts of impermissible favoritism so arbitrary or unjust as to give rise to a presumption
of invalidity under the Public Use Clause).
250 See generally Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 498.
251 Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 522, 538.
252 Id. at 538.
253 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of
Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N. C. L. REv. 713, 724-25 (2002) (arguing that J.
O'Connor entwines the Takings Clause and Due Process concepts in a problematic fashion). In fact, the
Court also recently advocated greater separation between Takings Clause and Due Process analysis,
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Justice Kennedy, who concurs in the judgment and dissents in part,
argues that the legislation at issue in Eastern Enterprises violates the Due
Process Clause, not the Takings Clause as the plurality holds.254 He asserts
that the Takings Clause is a conditional grant to the government, limited only
by the requirement that just compensation be made. 255 Kennedy finds that
retroactive legislation has traditionally been forbidden, except by the Due
256Process Clause. Thus, Kennedy's concurrence in Eastern Enterprises
serves as a precursor to his important concurrence in Kelo. In both opinions,
Kennedy examines claims of Takings Clause violations and ultimately
concludes that a taking would be invalid if predicated on irrational or unfair
257government action.   Though he only finds that the taking in Eastern
Enterprises rises to the level of being a due process violation, both
concurring opinions contain strong suggestions of limits on valid takings if
government action is arbitrary or irrational, both key concepts in substantive
due process jurisprudence.
The decision in Eastern Enterprises is anything but clear, but the
resulting confusion indicates an important overlap of the concepts involved
in Takings Clause and Due Process jurisprudence. 58 The Court, in the
recent case Lingle v. Chevron, attempted to provide some separation between
takings and due process analysis. In that case, the Court held that the inquiry
into whether a regulation "substantially advances" legitimate state interests is
properly a due process inquiry and is logically distinct from a takings
analysis. 259 The Lingle Court, however, carefully and explicitly limits its
ruling to the "substantially advances" formula and declines to take on the
larger issue of overlapping judicial concepts in takings and due process
inquiries that are evident in Eastern Enterprises.260 The confusion therefore
remains problematic for the following reason.
rejecting an argument to read certain due process concepts into Takings Clause doctrine. Lingle, 544 U.S.
at 528.
254 Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 539-50.
255 Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
26 Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
27 See id. 549-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that the retroactive legislation at issue
was neither just nor reasonable and was irrational in that it bore no legitimate relation to the interest which
the government asserted); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that a government-
facilitated private taking may deserve a presumption of invalidity if there is a risk of acute, undetected
impermissible favoritism).
25 Eastern Enterprises is further complicated by Justice Stevens' dissent, which asserts that the
proper analysis is under Due Process, not the Takings Clause, but that the legislation passes the
fundamental fairness test and should be upheld. 524 U.S. at 550-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
260 Id. at 545.
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The plurality in Eastern Enterprises suggests that a Due Process
inquiry would be appropriate only if the government action is in some way
arbitrary or irrational.261 Yet, now that the current Eminent Domain standard
allows a government-facilitated transfer to private parties with only indirect
public benefit, the door has seemingly been opened to arbitrary or irrational
government action. Though eminent domain actions traditionally proceed
with an underlying presumption that the government action is rational,
focusing more on the payment of just compensation,262 that presumption no
longer is assured. In other words, an eminent domain transfer that puts
property directly in the hands of private developers, with only incidental
public benefit, invites governments to promote use of eminent domain. The
government often stands to gain from these actions, either from contributions
by the wealthy developers, through increased tax revenue, or both.
Commencing an eminent domain action on these grounds, however, would
be arbitrary and fundamentally unfair. Arguably, the current reading of the
Takings Clause in regards to eminent domain actions actually necessitates an
inquiry into whether or not that government act was arbitrary or unfair.
X. Conclusion
Property rights' current plunge from importance must soon be
stopped. In an effort to revive the Takings Clause, the Court has instead
reduced property rights from their former status as fundamental alongside
life and liberty to a dangerous new low. As gentrification and urban
redevelopment continue in the coming years, it will be necessary to protect
against further disadvantaging the poor and minority residents of low-income
urban America. Because the Takings Clause cannot offer this protection,
property rights must be subject to Due Process analysis in eminent domain
actions.
261 Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 537.
262 See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (noting that "the Takings Clause presupposes that the
government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose" as opposed to acting arbitrarily).

